95 % or more are freemasons
CIA's AUGEAN STABLES
King Augean owned twelve white bulls sacred to Apollo. Their stables had not been cleaned in thirty years. Hercules had to do the work in one day. He diverted the course of a river, made it run through the stables, and completed his labor.
"The CIA's Directorate of Operations is in a state of deep rot." Former DCI John Deutch.
The Directorate of Operations is, a "wasteland, a Mecca for know-nothing men..." Former CIA Officer Reuel Gerecht, pen name, Edward Shirley.
U.S. intelligence "needs to be scrubbed" from the top down, from its spies to its analysts to its "bureaucratic barons." Admiral Jeremiah's 1998 report.
We might suggest to the current DCI, George Tenet, that he divert the Potomac River and clean out the CIA's "Augean Stables," the Directorate of Operations. Instead he has gone on a massive recruitment drive that will only pile up more manure.
The New York Times recently reported that Tenet has the CIA recruiting aggressively -- two or three thousand in the next few years. He says he must do this or risk the slow death of American intelligence. He hopes to make the clandestine service bigger than it was at the height of the Cold War, to open more overseas stations and bases, to mount more complex and more expensive secret operations. And he wants the nation's sharpest talents to come to work at CIA Headquarters as analysts, information technicians and in-house experts. He aims to revitalize an agency mired in a slough of despond-terrible publicity, terrible morale, terrible credibility.
Congress plans to pump hundreds of millions of extra dollars into the Agency over the next few years to get new blood flowing. Tenet rates the hiring blitz as the most important internal affair on the Agency's agenda for the rest of the century.
I suggest that the CIA's most important internal affair is cleaning out the Directorate of Operations Augean Stables -- its poor, incompetent and arrogant leaders. Even if those leaders were capable of recognizing their deficiencies, they do not have the ability to devise solutions.
Next the CIA must alter its personnel procedures that have resulted in rewarding incompetence and duplicity -- see a description of these in Edward Shirley's book, "Know Thine Enemy" or view his comments on my web page.
Another set of problems occurs with the CIA's Inspector General who tosses all protests back to the complainants' bosses. A prescription for disaster.
One issue that has plagued me since my time in the CIA is the complete inability of its operations officers to analyze. This has defeated intelligence collection in many ways. First the case officers cannot evaluate their agents. This is manifest -- Cuba's DGI ran three dozen agents the CIA thought was working for it. East Germany's Stasi had probably a few hundred double agents supposedly working for CIA, and the KGB's double agents convinced the CIA that the USSR was a viable, threatening menace when everyone else recognized its collapse.
These egregious realities have somehow avoided Tenet's notice as he happily builds atop its rotting foundations.
One reason (of a number of reasons) the DGI, Stasi and the KGB were able to dupe the CIA is that the operations officers had no incentive to, nor measuring ability, to question agent reporting.
There is also the problem that if a case officer questions his own agents' reporting, he then is questioning his own (the case officer's) promotability. The Operations Directorate promotes based on the number of agent recruitments -- the results be damned or ignored or never reviewed.
Since case officers are recruited for their rigid mentalities (those with flexible mentalities might question orders) and since Tenet uses the same personality qualifications for the new officers, he is recruiting disaster.
The CIA is hiring all sorts of new analysts but until it gets analysts directly involved in all phases of operations -- we can guarantee failure.
I must briefly cite my own personal experience at the risk of immodesty. The CIA in mid-1960s targeted me against the burgeoning insurgency in Thailand. (For a more complete description see my book, Deadly Deceits). Within about six months, using analysis and operations, I discovered what the Thai Communist Party was doing and how to defeat it -- a problem that had plagued the CIA for decades. I am not that good, it is just that the rest of the CIA's officers were that bad.
Next I asked to go to Vietnam because I wanted to defeat the communists there. With a little research and operations I quickly determined that the United States could not win in Vietnam and that the Agency had absolutely no idea what was happening in that country. An ignorance that continues to this day. My conclusions and protests landed me in the Agency's very vengeful doghouse.
So if Tenet has any sort of analytical ability himself he can see that he must first clean up the stables before trying to build anew.
A number of critics claim that I am far too soft on the CIA. I have in recent times changed my views to some extent. With the advent of international terrorism we need the best possible intelligence service to fight that terrifying menace. Instead we have the ignorant, arrogant and incompetent CIA.
We must recognize that the United States will always have an intelligence agency. It is my hope, therefore, that the CIA can change enough to become a real intelligence agency, if not it should be abolished or replaced by a new structure.